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ANALYZING THE CONSTITUTIONAL
TENSIONS AND APPLICABILITY OF

MILITARY RULE OF EVIDENCE 505 IN
COURTS-MARTIAL OVER UNITED STATES
SERVICE MEMBERS: SECRECY IN THE
SHADOW OF LONETREE
MAJOR JOSHUA

E. KASTENBERG'

The advent of the cold war brought concerns over classified national
security information becoming public in criminal trials.
The federal
government, in response, enacted the Classified Information Procedures Act
(CIPA) 2 in 1980. During the same time the CIPA was being finalized in
Congressional conference, President James Carter provided the United States
Military with a similar mandate to protect evidence. Rather than a creating a
specific act, the executive branch provided the military a "privilege"
mechanism to Prevent disclosure in the Military Rules of Evidence (MRE),
under rule 505. From its inception until 1990, military prosecutors made little
use of MRE 505. However, in United States v. Lonetree,4 a court-martial was
tasked, with protecting sensitive information regarding Soviet-directed
espionage. The trial court had to balance the inherently broader discovery
rights of an accused against the need to protect information crucial to national

security. 5 Since Lonetree, little analysis has occurred regarding the use of
' Major Kastenberg (B.A., U.C.L.A.; M.A., Purdue University; J.D., Marquette University;
L.L.M., Georgetown University Law School with highest honors), is Deputy Staff Judge
Advocate for the 5 2 nd Fighter Wing, Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany. He also teaches
military and Middle Eastern history for the University of Maryland. He singularly thanks
Professor James Zirkle, adjunct law instructor at Georgetown and general counsel to the
Central Intelligence Agency, as well as his family Elizabeth, Allenby and Clementine
Kastenberg.
2 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 1-16
(1982).
3 U IFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE (UCMJ) MRE 505.
See, e.g,, Captain Mark G.
Jackson, The Court-Martial is Closed: The Clash Between the Constitution and National
Security, 30 A.F. L. REV. 1 (1989). Jackson noted that President James Carter amended the
Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM) to include the Military Rules of Evidence in order to mirror
the federal rules. Id. (citing 16 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 493 (Mar. 14, 1980); Exec. Order
12,198, 45 Fed. Reg. 16,932 (1980)).
4 31 M.J. 849 (NMCMR 1990) [hereinafter Lonetree], aff'd 35 M.J. 396 (CMA 1992) cert.
denied,.507 U.S. 1017 (1993) [hereinafter Lonetree III].
5Under military law, a person accused of offenses is entitled to broader discovery rights than
found in federal law. See, e.g., United States v. Adens, 56 M.J. 724 (ACCA 2002) [stating that
broad discovery rights prevents gamesmanship]; United States v. Eshalomi, 23 M.J. 12 (CMA
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MRE 505. Yet, MRE 505 remains an important feature of military justice, just
as CIPA does to federal law. Because military members may be prosecuted for
the failure to control or maintain sensitive information, the future likelihood of
MRE 505 being invoked by the government is almost certain. Indeed, in the
past two years, military prosecutors in two high-profile cases, United States v.
Yee, 6 and United States v. al-Halabi,7 have invoked. MRE 505's protections.
Currently, with trials stemming from the abu-Gharib prisoner of war abuse
investigation, and the overall "Global War on terrorism," knowledge of the
parameters of MRE 505 will be important to all sides in the court-martial
process.
This article analyzes MRE 505 in both a comparative and
Constitutional context. Part I provides a procedural overview of both MIRE 505,
and its federal counterpart, CIPA, for protecting evidence vital to national
security in the criminal court context. Both mechanisms for protecting
sensitive information are analyzed for their efficiency from a prosecutorial
perspective. A study of CIPA is also provided because of the lack of military
case law and current analysis of MRE 505. CIPA and federal case law remain
important in providing guidance on the parameters of protecting classified
information in courts-martial.
Part II analyzes the defendant's twin Constitutionally-based rights to
present a complete defense and to a public trial. MRE 505, impacts to some
degree, these twin rights. The right to a public trial also bears importance as,
on occasion, third parties assert this right.
Part III then reviews the legal framework of MRE 505 within the
salient Lonetree case. Within the context of that case, particular attention is
focused on two issues: the right of public access and the responsibility to
protect classified evidence.
Part IV analyzes likely legal areas of future review. Continued analysis
on the right of public access is important because there has been a trend toward
increased media interest for military cases. 8 The responsibility to protect
1986) [holding that while Supreme Court decisions create mimimal thresholds for discovery
compliance, the president promulgated rules for military courts requiring full disclosure.]
6 For a discussion of the background and ultimate decision to drop charges against Yee, see
Neil A. Lewis, "Charges Dropped Against Chaplain," N.Y. Times, Mar. 20, 2004, at A1; and
Neil A. Lewis & Thom Shanker, "As Chaplain'sSpy Case Nears, Some Ask Why It Went So
Far," N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 2004, at Al.
7 For a discussion of the background and current status of United States v. al Halabi, see
Denny Walsh, "Judge Denies Bid to Drop Spy Case,"Sacramento Bee, June 17, 2004, at Al.
s See, e.g., Lieutenant Colonel Denise R, Lind, Media Rights of Access to Proceedings,
Information, and Participantsin Military Criminal Cases, 163 MIL. L. REV. 1, 2 (2000). Lind

writes, "Military cases are attracting local and national media interest.-As the armed forces
grow smaller, fewer people have experienced military life. Thus, the military justice system is
foreign to more and more Americans. People are interested in learning about how military
justice works. The media sells its product by generating news that is i~iteresting to the public."
Id.
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classified evidence is of importance, but for reasons that include an increased
role of the military in combating terrorism in both overseas and potentially
domestic operations, as well as other traditional reasons. Second, the issue of
an accused's right to a present a complete defense will continue to affect the
application of MRE 505 in trials. Finally, the right of an accused to choose
defense counsel may be impacted by the application of MRE 505. While this
article concludes the reasonable application of MRE 505 is constitutional,
judge advocates and agency attorneys should analyze the possible impact both
in the charging process and in the pursuit of justice. Likewise, potential
defense counsel should be fully aware of the law, its impact on the accused's
rights, and potential arguments for disclosure prior to trial.
Before proceeding however, a brief mention of the courts-martial
process bears importance as persons familiar with federal criminal law may be
unfamiliar with terminology used in the Uniform Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ). 9 Courts-martial may be divided into three types: general, special,
and summary. This breakdown is, in part, based on sentencing limitations.
Because the military does not have mandated sentencing guidelines, sentencing
occurs in a two dimensional context. Each offense possesses a jurisdictional
ceiling on punishment. 10 However, the special and summary courts-martial
forum further set a maximum ceiling. "1
9See, 10 U.S.C. §816. There are three types of courts-martial in each of the service branches.
These are:
(1) general courts-martial, consisting of
(a) a military judge and not less than five members; or
(b) only a military judge, if before the court is assembled the accused, knowing the
identity of the
military judge and after consultation with defense counsel, requests orally on the
record or in
writing a court composed only of a military judge and the military judge approves;
(2) special courts-martial, consisting of
(a) not less than three members; or
(b) a military judge and not less than three members; or
(c) ) only a military judge, if before the court is assembled the accused, knowing the
identity of the
military judge arid after consultation with defense counsel, requests orally on the
record or in
writing a court composed only of a military judge and the military judge approves;
(3) summary courts-martial, consisting of one commissioned officer.
Id.
'0UCMJ Articles 80 through 134 each proscribe maximum punishments for offenses.
" The maximum jurisdictional limit of a Special Court-Martial consists of discharge from
active duty with a bad conduct discharge, confinement for one year, reduction to the lowest
enlisted grade, two-thirds forfeiture of pay and allowance, and the possibility of a fine. See, 10
U.S.C. sec 819, Art 19, as amended by Pub. L 106-65 S. 1059 (HR 1401), 5 October 1999.
The maximum sentence which may be imposed by summary courts-martial are: one
month's confinement at hard labor; 45 days' hard labor without confinement; two months'
restriction to specified limits; reduction to the lowest enlisted pay grade; and forfeiture of twothirds pay for one month. Art. 20, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 820. Not all these sentence elements
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In military law, the terms indictment and defendant are not used.
Instead of indictment, the term preferral is utilized. 12 However, these terms are
not strictly synonymous. Likewise, instead of 'defendant,' the term 'accused'
is used. 13 These terms are roughly synonymous in regard to the legal rights of
charged persons. 14
The charging process begins with preferral of charges against an
accused. Any person subject to the UCMJ may prefer charges against an
accused. 15 Where an enlisted general court-martial is contemplated, 16a
preliminary investigation known as a UCMJ Article 32 investigation is held.
For all officers charged, an article 32 hearing is accomplished, as officers may
on be tried in general courts-martial.' 7 Although roughly akin to the grand jury
process, there are substantial differences, not pertinent to this article. Should
the charges be recommended either for a general court-martial or special court
martial, the charges must be referred by a convening authority.' Once the
charges are referred to a court-martial, an independent military judiciary
becomes involved with discovery matters, scheduling, evidentiary rulings, and
oversight of the case. 19

may be imposed in one sentence, and enlisted persons above the fourth enlisted pay grade may
not be sentenced to confinement or hard labor by summary courts-martial, or reduced except to
the next inferior grade. MCM pp 16b and 127c. See also, Middendorf, Sec of Navy v. Henry,
425 U.S. 25, 33, 96 S. Ct. 1281, 1287, 47 L. Ed. 2d 556 (1976)
12 See, RCM 307 Preferral of charges. It is important to note that any
person subject to the
UCMJ may prefer charges. However, an accuser who prefers charges must sign the charges
and specifications under oath before a commissioned officer authorized to administer oaths,
and state that he or she has personal knowledge of the charges or has investigated the matters
in them. Additionally the accuser must believe the charges to be true under a unique standard
which reads "true in fact to the best of that person's knowledge and belief." Id., see also
United States v. Miller, 31 M.J. 798 (AFCMR 1990)
r3 See, RCM 308
14 Over time, the court-martial has come to substantively mirror the
federal criminal court
system. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 27 M.J. 242 (CMA 1988). There are, however,
specific rights of military members not found in state and federal courts, such as the legal
protection against unlawful command influence. See, e.g., Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S.
163, 114 S. Ct. 752, 127 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1994) Curry v. Secretary of the Army, 595 F.2d 873, 879
(1979); United States v. Stoneyman, 57 M.J. 35 (2002) (each reaffirming unlawful command
influence as "the mortal enemy of military justice".
"sSee R.C.M. 307. The individual preferring charges must be sworn and believe, to their best
knowledge, the substance of the charges to be true.
16 See UCMJ, Article 32. For a discussion regarding the differences between
an Article 32
hearing and a grand jury proceeding, see Lieutenant Colonel Theodore Essex and Major Leslea
Pickle, A Reply to the Cox Commission on the 50th Anniversary of the Uniform Code of
MilitaryJustice, 52 A.F.L. Rev 233, 250-51 (2002)
17 See UCMJ, Article 32
ISSee R.C.M. 601
'9 See, e.g., Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S., at 180-81, (holding that the military justice
system possesses inherent safeguards to insure judicial impartiality)
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I: Classified Information Procedure Act and MRE 505: Overview
A. CIPA

The Supreme Court has both carved exceptions and recognized limits
to a defendant's Constitutional rights. 20 Some of these rights might be viewed
as impacting the traditional view of the right to a fair trial. 2 1 For instance, the
right of individual liberty may become secondary in wartime where the
government believes the individual to be dangerous to national security. 22 In
criminal cases involving sexual abuse against children, there is no absolute
Sixth Amendment confrontation clause right to confront the child witness in
the presence of the defendant. 23 Likewise, in rape and sexual assault cases,
mechanisms exist to protect the identity of the victim from the public. 24 In
terms of national security related evidence, the importance of protecting such
information against public view is balanced through CIPA.
Passed by Congress in 1980, CIPA was designed to address a growing
problem of graymail. 25 Graymail is a term describing a defendant's threat to
expose classified intelligence through otherwise lawful procedural means

20

See e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932) [holding the right to secure defense

counsel of choice is not absolute]
2,

But see, BLACKS

LAW DICTIONARY

(defining a fair and impartial trial as "a hearing by an

impartial and disinterested tribunal; a proceeding which hears before it condemns, which
proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment only after trial consideration or evidence and
facts as a whole"). The dictionary cites Raney v. Commonwealth for the proposition that a fair
trial is "one where the accuser's legal rights are safeguarded and respected. BLACKS LAW
DICTIONARY, 596 6th ed. 1990. See, Irwin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 728 (1961), holding:
More than one student of society has expressed the view that not the least
significant test of the quality of a civilization is its treatment of those charged
with crime, particularly with offenses which arouse the passions of a community.
One of the rightful boasts of Western civilization is that the state has the burden
of establishing guilt solely on the basis of the evidence produced in court and
under circumstances assuring an accused all the safeguards of a fair trial.
Id., at 729 (Frankfurter J.concurring).
22 See e.g. ,Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, (1948) [permitting the internments of foreign
nationals of an enemy state during time of war]
23 See, e.g., Marylandv. Craig 497 U.S. 836 (1990) [permitting a child victim to testify outside
of the presence of a defendant in specified circumstances]
24 See, e.g., MRE 412 [limiting the admissibility of a victim's sexual conduct that is unrelated
to an accused's charged offense]; Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 412 [limiting the
admissibility of a victim's sexual conduct that is unrelated to an defendant's charged offense];
and, United States v. Yazzie, 59 F.3d 807 (9th Cir 1998)
25 See, e.g., David I. Greeenberger, An Overview of the Ethical Implications of the Classified
Information Procedures Act, 12 GEO. J. LEG. ETHICS 151 (1998) (citing, S. Rep. No. 96-456,
at 2 (1980)) (defining Graymail as a tactic of threatening to disclose classified information
during the course of the prosecution in order to influence prosecutorial discretion). also,
Sandra Jordan, Classified Information and Conflicts in Independent Counsel Prosecutions:
Balancingthe Scales of JusticeAfter Iran-Contra,91 COLUMB. L. REV. 1651 (1991).
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during trial.26 Graymail use in cases involving classified information is
problematic for the government because it has dissuaded prosecution in some
cases. 27 CIPA was not designed to provide prosecutors otherwise repugnant
advantages over defendants. 28 Federal courts are obligated to watch for
overzealous use of CIPA and do not always accept government proffers of
necessity to protect classified evidence. For instance, in United States v.
Fernandez,29 the government appealed a trial judge's order to release classified
information, or in the alternative, to dismiss charges against a defendant. 30 On
prosecution appeal, the Fourth Circuit held the trial judge did not abuse his
discretion in executing this order. 31 The trial judge reviewed the contested
evidence and based his order on this review as well as the arguments of both
parties. He concluded that requirements of a fair trial, including
the right to
33
present a complete defense necessitated the release of evidence.
CIPA defines classified information as "any information or material
that has been determined by the United States government pursuant to an
Executive Order, statute, or regulation, to require protection against authorized
disclosure for reasons of national security. 3 4 Likewise, national security is
35
defined as "the national defense and foreign relations of the United States."
Neither of these terms have been found to be unconstitutionally vague. 3 6 CIPA
permits any party, after an issue of indictment, to move the court for a pretrial
conference "to consider matters relating to classified information that may
arise in connection with the prosecution."' 37 In this conference, the court must
consider timing of discovery requests, the provision of notice requirements,
and the procedure to38determine the use, relevance, and admissibility, of
classified information.

26 Greenberger,
27

supra note 22 at 152.
See, e.g., Richard Salgado, Government Secrets, Fair Trials, and the Classified Information

ProceduresAct, 98 YALE L.J. 427, 429-91 (1988).
28 United States v. La Rouche Campaign, 695 F.Supp 1282, 1285 (D.Mass 1988).
h
29 913 F.2d 148 (4" Cir. 1990).
30 Id. at 149. Joseph Fernandez had been interviewed by officers from the inspector general
concerning his tenure as CIA station chief in San Jose, Costa Rica. He specifically was
questioned about paramilitary support activities, his association with Col Oliver North, and the
construction of an airstrip with CIA funds. Id. He was later charged with making false
statements to the investigators as well as obstruction of justice. Id.
31 id.
32 Id.
33 id.
34 18

35 18

U.S.C.app 3 §1.

U.S.C. app 3. §1
See United States v. Wilson, 571 F. Supp. 1422 (D.C. NY 1983) United States v. Joliff 548 F.
Supp 229 (D.C.Md 1981)
37 18 U.S.C. app 3,§ 2 (2000)
36

38

Id.
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CIPA permits the prosecution to seek a protective order from the
This protective order is designed to prevent any classified information
disclosed by the United States to a party in the criminal case. a° The order is
also intended to establish adequate procedures to protect classified information
at all stages of the trial.4 ' CIPA requires the appointment of a court security
officer (CSO) to oversee the order. The CSO is charged to insure classified
information is properly handled while assisting both parties and the court in
obtaining security clearances. a3
As noted above, CIPA was not designed to provide an advantage for
the prosecution by limiting discovery. Indeed, Section 4 of CIPA balances the
discovery rights of a defendant against the government's national security
considerations. It permits the court to redact or delete classified items not
relevant to an element of a specific defense. 4 It also permits the government
to provide a summary substitute of information.4 5 However, the government
appears required to provide the court, in camera, with a complete copy of the
evidence to insure the defendant's discovery rights are intact.46 Section 4 does
not abrogate discovery requirements under the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, nor is the in camera process unconstitutionally constraining on the
right to mount a defense. 7 Finally, during the discovery process, classified
court. 39

39

18 U.S.C. app 3, § 3. See also United States v. Pappas, 94 F.3d 795 (2nd Cir. 1996). In

Pappas, the government argued a judge's protective order was not a proper subject for an
interlocutory appeal. Id. In determining when a protective order is appealable, the Second
Circuit held:
the scope of CIPA prohibitions on a defendant's disclosure of classified information
may be summarized as follows: information conveyed by the Government to the
defendant in the course of pretrial discovery or the presentation of the Government's
case may be prohibited from disclosure, including public disclosure outside the
courtroom, but information acquired by the defendant prior to the criminal
prosecution may be prohibited from disclosure only "in connection with the trial" and
not outside the trial.
Id. at 801. Thus, where a judge provides a broad protective order for matters outside the
pending litigation, a defendant may seek an interlocutory appeal. However, in the military
context, it may be the case that public dissemination of classified materials may cause further
charges for dereliction of duty, or disbarment of civilian defense counsel.
40 18 U.S.C. app 3, §3.
41 id.
42

Id. The CSO is an employee of the Department of Justice's Management Division. Id.

43 id.
44 18 U.S.C. app. 3, § 3.
45 Id.

For understanding the court's procedural requirements, see 18 U.S.C. app 6(d). Under
this provision, the courts are required to seal all materials it determines, during an in camera
proceeding, as non-discoverable. Because either party may seek appellate relief, the sealed
information is available for consideration to the appellate court.
47 See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 721 F.2d 967, 976 (40t Cir. 1983), cert. denied., 479 U.S.
839 (1986) [holding in camera review by trial judge comported with due process requirements];
United States v. Joliff, 548 F. Supp. 229, 232 [holding the use of in camera proceedings are
"particularly appropriate" prior to the release of classified evidence]; United States v. Wen Ho
46Id.

Analyzing the Constitutional Tensions of MRE-239

information is not discoverable on a mere showing of theoretical relevance in
face of the government's classified information privilege.48
Once the defense is provided with classified information, they are
required to inform the government of their intent to disclose the information at
trial. 49 This includes instances where the defendant has been privy to classified
information prior to trial, by virtue of employment. 50 The notice must
adequately specify the classified information, including, hard-copy materials,
statements intended for open court, testimony envisioned as elicited from
witnesses on cross or direct examination, or any attempt at making information
public. 51 The remedy for an incomplete or late notice includes a further order
for specificity, or even suppression. 52 For instance, in United States v.
Collins,s3 a retired United States Air Force general was prosecuted in federal
court for misuse of government monies while he was on active duty. 54 Collins
notified the government of his intent to use classified information in his
The prosecution objected to Collins' notice arguing it lacked
defense.
specificity. 56 The trial judge concluded the notice lacked specificity and

Lee, 90 F. Supp.2d 1324, 1326 (D.C. NM 2000). [holding in camera proceedings appropriate
in cases where classified evidence may be divulged.]
48 See, United States v. Yunis, 867 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
49 18 U.S.C. app. 3, § 5. See also, United States v. Miller, 874 F.2d 1255, 1276 (9t' Cir. 1989),
rehearingdenied 884 F.2d 1149 ( 9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied 510 U.S. 894 (1991). [holding
that a generalized description of classified evidence satisfied the CIPA notice requirement].
50 See., UnitedStates v. Collins, 720 F.2d 1195 (1 1 h Cir 1983).
51

ld.

id.
53
720 F.2d 1195 (11h Cir 1983).
54 Id., at 1196. Interestingly, the Secretary of the Air Force did not recall him to active duty
for prosecution before court-martial. A recall to active duty would have been lawful. See, e.g.,
UCMJ Article 2(a); United States v. Overton, 24 M.J.309 (CMA 1984) cert. denied 428 U.S.
976 (1987); Sands v. Colby, 35 M.J. 620 (ACMR 1992). However, a finding of guilt before a
court-martial could have resulted in loss of all retirement benefits. See e.g., United States v.
Reed, 54 M.J. 37 (CAAF 2000). [holding that although dismissal of an officer usually results
in a loss of retirement benefits, such a loss is seen as a collateral consequence to the court
martial sentence.]
55 720 F.2d, at 1197. Collins notification read as follows:
Said classified information concerns activities of the U.S. Government with respect to
joint Intelligence/Military operations and the utilization of secret overseas bank
accounts to finance said operations. Moreover, said classified information includes
the developing of secret government bank accounts and the transfer of funds
surreptitiously into the United States Treasury. In addition the defendant intends to
disclose or cause the disclosure of all matters coming within the defendant's
administration as Director of (his job description) for the United States Air Force, and,
as such, his operation of a unit of said department called "(named)" which
coordinated many operations in Southeast Asia and elsewhere.
Id., at 1197-98.
52

56

id.
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ordered Collins' to supplement the notice. 57 Collins failed to comply, and the
court, despite prosecution objections, permitted Collins to generally admit
classified information. 5 8 However, because the government remained unaware
59
of specific evidence, the prosecution directly appealed to the circuit court.
The Eleventh Circuit held that Collins' notification lacked specificity and
remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. 6P Had Collins
refused to comply with the Eleventh Circuit's ruling, it is conceivable the trial
court could have suppressed his classified evidence from the trier of fact.
Once the defense provides notice, the prosecution is afforded the
opportunity to object to the use, relevance, and admissibility of the evidence as
per section (c). 61 Additionally, the prosecution may motion the court to permit
62
summaries or redacted copies in lieu of the original classified information.
Likewise, limitations on testimony may be sought and granted.63 For instance,
in United States v. Collins,64 on remand, the defense argued section 6(c) was
unconstitutional because it precluded the right to a complete defense. 65 The
district court held that through its gatekeeper duties it insured the right
remained intact. 66 Although the court felt Collins presented a case of "first
impression," it alluded to its power to alter evidence presentation through FRE
401 and 403, was the basis for its ability to limit evidence under CIPA.6 7
Collins, is an important benchmark case for an additional reason. The District
Court's articulated that the historic basis underlying the right to obtain
discovery and present a complete defense is not eroded under CEPA.6 8 Second,
the court found its gatekeeper duties in CIPA cases
Should the court fail to grant relief, CIPA affords the prosecution the
69
interlocutory appeal, to seek relief though the appellate process.
via
right,
The attorney general may also file an affidavit objecting to disclosure. 70 If this
Id. The district court ordered General Collins to make a "good faith effort" to supplement
the notice, but no new or supplemental notice was filed or required. Id. The court ordered the
government to furnish defendant with information to assist defendant in identifying and
describing classified information, and the government furnished various documents. Id.
17

58

Id.

59
Id.
60

Id., at 1119-1200. stating,
The court must not countenance a Section 5(a) notice
intentions and leave the government subject to
his
to
cloak
defendant
a
which allows
surprise at what may be revealed in the defense. To do so would merely require the
defendant to reduce "graymail" to writing. Id.
61 18 U.S.C. app.3 § 6 (2000)
62 Id.

63 Id.

64 603 F. Supp. 301 (S.D. Fla 1985) [hereinafter Collins II]
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 See id, at 304.

61 Id., at 303
69 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 6(e)(1) (2000).
70 18 U.S.C. app.3 § 7.
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occurs, the court may require the prosecution to dismiss charges. 7 1 Forcible
dismissal is unlikely for two reasons. First, Congress designed CIPA to
Second, Federal courts have
prevent a forcible dismissal of charges.
recognized CIPA's design to prevent "graymail," as the government possesses
a strong interest in bringing suspected criminal offenders to trial as part of its
police power.
B. Military Rule of Evidence 505
In a court-martial, government information may be privileged under
two different rules of evidence. Military Rule of Evidence (MRE) 505
provides protection for classified information. MRE 506 provides protection
72
for unclassified, but important government information. This article does not
address MRE 506.
MRE 505 permits a privilege against evidentiary disclosure where the
disclosure would be detrimental to national security. 73 It also encompasses all
stages of a criminal proceeding. 74 The rule defines the term classified
information as "any information or material that has been determined by the
United States Government pursuant to an executive order, statute, or
regulations, to require protection against unauthorized disclosure for reasons of
national security, and any restricted data, as defined in 42 U.S.C. 2014." 75
Additionally, MRE 505 defines "national security" as "the national defense
and foreign relations of the United States."' 76 These terms, although not
considered in a military context, as noted above, have been upheld as valid
terms and not unconstitutionally vague.
The privilege may be asserted by the head of the executive or military
department or government agency.77 The condition for asserting the privilege
is twofold. First, the information must be properly classified. 8 Second, a
release of the information must be detrimental to the national security.79 An
80
assertion of the privilege does not require the agency head to appear at court.

Instead, the agency head may delegate the assertion to trial counsel, or a
7 id.
72

See MRE 506; United States v. Rivers, 44 M.J. 839 (ACCA 1998). This rule is also known

as the public interest privilege. While this rule is not analyzed in this Article, mention of it is
required for the remaining analysis.
71 MRE 505(a).
74 Id. MRE 505 states:(a) General rule of privilege. Classified information is privileged from
disclosure if disclosure would be detrimental to the national security. As with other rules of
?rivilege this rule applies to all stages of the proceedings.
MRE 505(b)(1); 42 U.S.C. 2014.
76 MRE 505(b)(2).
71 MRE 505(c).
78Id.
79 Id.
8o Id.
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witness. 8 1 The authority of either is assumed in the absence of contrary
evidence.82 Only one published decision analyzes the delegation of power
issue. In United States v. Flannigan,83 the Air Force Court determined that the
commander of the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) did not
have the authority to, sua sponte, declare material classified.84 The Air Force
Court of Criminal Appeals concluded the plain language of MRE 505
mandates only the "head of the military department concerned" possessed that
authority. 85 The court recognized the Secretary of the Air Force could have
86
properly delegated authority to the AFOSI commander, but had not done so.
Interestingly, both the prosecution and AFOSI would have been better served
in arguing the public policy exceptions under MRE 506.
Additionally, the quantum of evidence (or burden on the accused)
required to dispute proper classification, proper delegation of authority, or
impact on national security has not been fully established. Given the
traditional deference of courts to executive determinations, the quantum of
required evidence would be greater than the preponderance standard typical in
other pretrial motion determinations, making the burden of the defendant very
88 an agency's decision to not
high.87 For instance, in United States v. Pruner,
declassify information was discussed by the Court of Military Appeals. Pruner
was prosecuted under the UCMJ for desertion on the eve of the first Persian
Gulf War. 89 He was assigned as an intelligence analyst with the It Infantry
Division.9" Pruner motioned the court to order evidence declassified, not for
findings, but for extenuation and mitigation in sentencing. 9 1 In the alternative,
he motioned the court to force the prosecution to dismiss charges. 92 Neither
81 Id.
82 Id.

1989) rev.d 31 M.J. 240 (1990) (reversing in part on other grounds)
Flannigan, an AFOSI agent was convicted of dereliction of duty (UCMJ, Article 92), wrongful
use of marijuana (UCMJ, Article 112a), and adultery (UCMJ, Article 134). Id., He was
sentenced to a bad conduct discharge, reduction to E-2 and seven months confinement. Id., at
988. However, on appeal, the Air Force court reassessed the sentence a bad conduct discharge,
83 28 M.J. 988

(AFCMR

reduction to E-3 and a seven months confinement. Id. at 991.
4 Id. at 989-90. AFOSI sought to declare specific regulations titled "OSI Regulation 124-68,
Undercover Guide," and "OSI Pamphlet 124-51" as vital to national security. Id.
81 Id. at 990.
86

id.

87

See, e.g., MRE 311; United States v. Beckett, 49 M.J. 354 (CAAF 1998).

88 31 M.J. 272 (CMA1991).

89 Id. Specifically, Pruner was charged with desertion with intent to avoid hazardous duty
(UCMJ, Article 85), absence without leave with intent to avoid maneuvers (UCMJ, Article 86),
and missing a movement (UCMJ, Article 80). He also unsuccessfully sought to enjoin the
Army from prosecution in the federal courts. See Prunerv. Department of the Army, 755 F.
Supp 362 (D.Kan. 1991).
90 Pruner,19 M.J. at 273. Pruner also asked to court for permission to release classified
information to his military and civilian defense counsel.
91Id.
92

Id.
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the military judge at trial, nor the Army Court of Criminal Appeals found
disclosure was required, in part, because Pruner failed to comply with
procedural disclosure requirements. 93 Thus, the Army Court of Criminal
Appeals did not fashion a burden of proof for an accused to overcome.
As noted above, referral of charges constitutes the convening
authority's decision to try charges before courts-martial. Referral of charges
also imposes discovery requirements on the government. However, where
classified evidence is in question an additional burden is placed on the
government. Prior to referral of charges, the convening authority must notify
an accused that evidence of a classified nature exists, but that such evidence
will not be provided to the defense. 94 The convening authority may delete
classified specified items of documentary evidence prior to providing a copy to
the defense. 95 A summary of evidence may also be provided. 96 Substitute
statements in lieu of original statements are also possible. 97 Finally, the
convening authority may decide against any disclosure if no means to protect
the national security may be accomplished during disclosure. 98 However, in
each of these possibilities, the original items must be provided to the military
judge for in camera review. 99 The military judge then becomes the arbiter of
sealed evidence, insuring a fair trial. The convening authority may also permit
the defense to review the entire 00
original evidence but place limits on the
location of viewing and disclosure.'
After referral of charges but prior to trial, either the prosecution or
defense can seek a pretrial session to consider and resolve matters relating to
the discovery or presentation of classified matters.10 ' Moreover, the military
judge is required to hold a pretrial session when classified matters arise.10 2 He
or she must determine the timing of requests for discovery; whether the
accused has stated an intention to disclose classified information and, the
initiation of in camera proceedings to determine disclosure.' 0 3 It is possible
that where an accused, holding a security clearance or other pertinent classified
information, is charged with an offense such as dereliction of duty, the accused
10 4
may seek to testify as to classified material as part of a recognized defense.
93 Id.

Pruner's arguments are highly suspicious of "graymail" because the classified
information he claimed to possess.
94 See e.g., MRE 505(d)(1).
9s Id.

MRE 505(d)(2).
505(d)(3).
9' MRE 505(d)(5).
99 MRE 707(g)(2) provides for in camera review. A party motions the judge for in camera
review if it seeks to have discovery denied, restricted, or deferred. Id.
i MRE 505(d)(4).
96

9"MIZE

'00 MRE 505(e). This section arguably exists to ensure a steady flow of trial.
102

id.

103

id.

'04

MRE 505(f).
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Where the accused claims privilege under MRE 505 and the defense
intends to introduce classified evidence, the defense is required to notify the
prosecution and convening authority. 105 This notification enables the
convening authority to seek a judicial in camera determination as to release of
evidence, 106 dismiss the all charges, dismiss the specifications and charges to
which the evidence relates,' 0 7 or, take other action to ensure the interest of
justice are served. 18 It is essential to note that, nothing in the rule prevents the
prosecution from seeking suppression under other rules of evidence, namely
MRE's 401-402°9 and MRE 403.110 However, the prosecution must be careful
not to argue that the fact some evidence is classified, the military judge should
weigh this in a standard admissibility determination."'
Within MRE 505, there are different means of protecting or preventing
the disclosure of evidence. The prosecution can seek a protective order from
the military judge."12 The nature of the protection may take several forms such
105

Id.

106

MRE 505(0(1).
MRE 505(0(2).

107

108 MRE 505()(3).

109MRE 401 reads:
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or
less probable than it would be without the evidence." Id. MRE 402 reads in pertinent
part, "Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible." MRE 402. MRE 401 is an
exact copy of FRE 401. Likewise MRE 402 closely follows FRE 402.
"10 MRE 403 reads:
"Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading
the members, or by the consideration of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of the evidence." Id. MRE 403 is an exact copy of FRE 403.
"' Although no military case law is on point as to this issue, see, e.g., United States v.
Baptista-Rodriguez, 17 F.3d 1354, 1363 (1 Ith Cir. 1994) [In this case, the Eleventh Circuit held,
"the district court may not take into account the fact that evidence is classified when
determining its "use, relevance, or admissibility.]
112 MRE 505(g)(1) reads:
(1) Protective order. If the Government agrees to disclose classified information to the accused,
the military judge, at the request of the Government, shall enter an appropriate protective order
to guard against the compromise of the information disclosed to the accused. The terms of any
such protective order may include provisions:
(A) Prohibiting the disclosure of the information except as authorized by the military
judge; (B) Requiring storage of material in a manner appropriate for the level of
classification assigned to the documents to be disclosed; (C) Requiring controlled
access to the material during normal business hours and at other times upon
reasonable notice; (D) All persons requiring security clearances shall cooperate with
investigatory personnel in any investigations which are necessary to obtain a security
clearance; (E) Requiring the maintenance of logs regarding access by all persons
authorized by the military judge to have access to the classified information in
connection with the preparation of the defense; (F) Regulating the making and
handling of notes taken from material containing classified information; or (G)
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as an order to store documents at a single protected location, or regulate the
taking and handling of notes. The prosecution can also motion the judge to
prevent disclosure of evidence to the defense altogether, with possible
substitute evidence such as summaries or redactions from reports." 3 As part of
the judicial determination, procedures are set for in camera review.ll 4 In terms
Requesting the convening authority to authorize the assignment of government
security personnel and the provision of government storage facilities.
MRE 505(g)(1).
113 MRE 505(g)(2) reads:

(2) Limited disclosure. The military judge, upon motion of the Government, shall
authorize (A) the deletion of specified items of classified information from documents
to be made available to the defendant, (B) the substitution of a portion or summary of
the information for such classified documents, or (C) the substitution of a statement
admitting relevant facts that the classified information would tend to prove, unless the
military judge determines that disclosure of the classified information itself is
necessary to enable the accused to prepare for trial. The Government's motion and any
materials submitted in support thereof shall, upon request of the Government, be
considered by the military judge in camera and shall not be disclosed to the accused.
114 MRE 505(i) In camera proceedings for cases involving classified information.
(1) Definition. For purposes of this. subdivision, an "in camera proceeding" is a
session under Article 39(a) from which the public is excluded.
(2) Motion for in camera proceeding. Within the time specified by the military judge
for the filing of a motion under this rule, the Government may move for an in camera
proceeding concerning the use at any proceeding of any classified information.
Thereafter, either prior to or during trial, the military judge for good cause shown or
otherwise upon a claim of privilege under this rule may grant the Government leave
to move for an in camera proceeding concerning the use of additional classified
information.
(3) Demonstration of national security nature of the information. In order to obtain an
in camera proceeding under this rule, the Government shall submit the classified
information and an affidavit ex parse for examination by the military judge only. The
affidavit shall demonstrate that disclosure of the information reasonably could be
expected to cause damage to the national security in the degree required to warrant
classification under the applicable executive order, statute, or regulation.
(4) In camera proceeding.
(A) Procedure. Upon finding that the Government has met the standard set forth in
subdivision (i)(3) with respect to some or all of the classified information at issue, the
military judge shall conduct an in camera proceeding. Prior to the in camera
proceeding, the Government shall provide the accused with notice of the information
that will be at issue. This notice shall identify the classified information that will be at
issue whenever that information previously has been made available to the accused in
connection with proceedings in the same case. The Government may describe the
information by generic category, in such form as the military judge may approve,
rather than identifying the classified information when the Government has not
previously made the information available to the accused in connection with pretrial
proceedings. Following briefing and argument by the parties in the in camera
proceeding the military judge shall determine whether the information may be
disclosed at the court-martial proceeding. Where the Government's motion under this
subdivision is filed prior to the proceeding at which disclosure is sought, the military
judge shall rule prior to the commencement of the relevant proceeding.
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of defense counsel and witnesses being able to view classified information, the
onus is placed on all parties to facilitate the background clearance process. 15
Where an accused indicates his intention to disclose classified
information, a notice requirement is placed on the defense. The accused is
required to provide both the prosecution and military judge notice, at a
minimum time prior to arraignment. 116 This requirement is a continuing duty
and there must be adequate specificity as to the contents of the testimony or
evidence. 117 Under MRE 505, an accused is prohibited from disclosing
classified information without first providing notice. 118 This is so the
government has the opportunity to seek protection of the classified
information. 119 The rule provides sanctions for failing to provide adequate
notice. These sanctions include suppression of evidence or prohibiting
examination of witnesses with respect to the classified information.
Likewise, where the prosecution fails to disclose evidence, or if the
military judge determines the accused is entitled access to classified evidence,
the rule provides possible sanctions against the government. These sanctions
include limiting witness testimony,' 2 ' declaring a mistrial, 12 2 findings against
the government in issues where the classified information is relevant; 123 and
24 The latter action may occur with or without prejudice to
dismissing charges.'
25
1
the government.
While in trial, the military judge serves as a "gatekeeper" for classified
evidence. He or she is empowered to prevent unnecessary disclosure of
classified information. 126 Additionally, the military judge may permit
admission of only part of a writing or recording, or photograph that contains
15 MRE 506, supra note 106. See, e.g., Lieutenant Colonel Eugene R. Milhizer and
Lieutenant Colonel Thomas W. McShane, Analysis of Change 6 to the 1984 Manual for
Courts-Martial, 1994 ARMY LAW. 40, 43. MRE 505(g)(1)(D) was amended to require the
cooperation of all persons requiring security clearances, including defense counsel, in
investigations necessary to obtain such clearances. Id. The amendment recognizes that the
military judge has authority to require such cooperation from those involved in both the
preparation and the conduct of the trial. Id.
116 MRE 505(h)(1). The accused is required to notify prior to arraignment. However, the
rule
envisions earlier notification so that the military judge may fashion procedures during trial to
protect information. Id.
117 MRE 505(h)(2)-(3). The notice required must be more than a mere general
statement of
areas about which evidence may be introduced. The statement must particularize items of
classified information. Id.
118 MRE 505(h)(4).
119Id.

MRE 505(h)(5).
505(i)(4)(E)(I).
122 MRE 505(i)(4)(E)(II).
123 MRE 505(i)(4)(E)(III).
124 MRE 505(i)(4)(E)(IV).
125 Id
126 MRE 5056)(2).
120

121MRE
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classified information.' 27 The military judge may also prohibit a witness from
testifying as to classified matters.' 28 Finally, the military judge may close the
trial to the public. 129 Wherever classified information is protected, this
protection extends to a portion, or all, of the record of trial.' 30
II. Federal and Military Law: Public Access and the Right to a
"Complete Defense," in light of balancing concerns:
In the context of trials concerning national security information,
perhaps the two greatest issues are disclosure of information to the public and
discovery rights. Within the issue of disclosure come three separate concerns.
The first concern involves the defendant's right to a public trial. Additionally,
the rights of third parties, such as media, have a "qualified First Amendment
right" to attend and report on trials. In cases involving espionage, there is a
trend toward media interest. 13 1 A third concern involves the presentation of
evidence via the evidentiary rules under the Military Rules of Evidence. The
basis of this right begins in the pretrial discovery requirements on the
government. In terms of discovery rights, as noted above, in military courtsmartial, an accused is afforded broader discovery rights than found in either
federal or most state law. MRE 505 serves as a mechanism for limiting these
rights through the military judge's role as a gatekeeper. Secondarily, the
defense may be precluded from presentation of evidence for non-compliance
with MRE 505.
A. Right to Public trial under United States and Military Law and the
Qualified First Amendment Rights of Third Parties; in the National
Security Context
A defendant has a right to a public trial. 13 This right is rooted in the
common law concept of public transparency to ensure due process and a fair

Id.
128 Id.
127

129

MRE 5050)(5).

30

MRE 505(k).
See, e.g., Major Christopher M. Maher, The Right to a Fair Trial in Criminal Cases
Involving the Introduction of Classified Information, 120 MIL. L. REV. 83 (1988).
132 See, e.g., Press Enterprise Co., v. Superior Court of California (Press Enterprise 1), 464
U.S. 501 (1984). Holding that the right of public access includes jury voire dire processes.
Likewise, in Gannett Co., v. Di Pasquale,443 U.S. 368, 99 S.Ct. 2898, 61 L.Ed.2d 608 (1979),
the Court held the public enjoyed a qualified right to attend pretrial hearings. Id. at 397,
Additionally, in Globe Newspaper Co,. v. Superior Courtfor Norfolk County, 457 U.S. 596,
(1982), the Court found that both the press and public had a "qualified First Amendment right
" to attend a criminal trial. Id.
131
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trial. 133 The right to a public trial also applies to third parties in a First
Amendment context.134 The burden on the government to prohibit the press
from reporting an essentially public function is exceedingly high. 35 Almost
all aspects of the judiciary are considered subject to public scrutiny.
The right to public trial is guaranteed as a basic right in the Sixth
Amendment's public trial clause, which provides that "in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a . . . public trial."' 13 6 For
instance, in Waller v. Georgia,137 the Court held that a prosecution sought
court closure was unjustified. The prosecution motioned the trial court to close
a pretrial hearing involving wiretap evidence because of a fear that public
disclosure could harm the ability to investigate and prosecute persons other
than the defendants. 38 In reversing a lower court's acceptance of this
argument, the Court reasoned that public access enhances the goals of the
criminal process. These goals include ensuring the prosecutor and judge carry
out their duties openly and responsibly, 39 encouraging witnesses to testify
truthfully while discouraging perjury,' 40 and keeping all parties to the trial
"keenly alive
to a sense of their responsibility and to the importance of their
14 1
functions."'

As in the case of several Sixth Amendment issues, the right to an open
trial is not absolute. In Press-EnterpriseCo. v. Superior Court of California,
(hereafter, Press-Enterprise-1)142 the Court developed a test for determining
when a trial may be closed to the public. The case issue originated in the
context of a criminal trial. The state brought a twelve-count murder charge
against a nurse and sought the death penalty. 143 The defendant successfully
motioned the local magistrate to exclude the public from all proceedings. The
See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 570, 65 L.Ed.2d 973, 100 S.Ct.
2814 (1980). In Richmond Newspapers, the court held:
"One of the demands of a
democratic society is that the public should know what goes on in courts
by being told
by the press what happens there, to the end that the public may judge whether the
system of criminal justice is fair and right." Id., at 573., citing Maryland v. Baltimore
Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912, 920 (1950). In Richmond Newspapers, however, one of the
court's primary concerns dealt with the trial court's failure to make specific findings of fact
where the defendant would be prejudiced by having his trial open to the public. Id., at 581.
134 U.S. CONST. AMEND. I The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech or the press." U.S. CONST. AMEND. I
"5 See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 715-17 (1971) (Black J.
concurring).
36
133

1 U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI.
137 467 U.S. 39 (1984)
138 Id. at 42, On appeal, the

Georgia supreme court held the trial judge properly balanced the
prosecutors request with the defendant's right to a public trial. Id.
139 Id. at 46.
140 id.
Id., (citing In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 n. 25, (1948) (quoting Thomas Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations 647 (8th ed. 1927))
142 478 U.S. 1, (1986).
141 Id. at 2.
"4'
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motion was granted under the California penal code. 144 A news consortium
unsuccessfully challenged the magistrate's decision at both the state appellate
and state supreme-court. 145 However, their challenge resulted in only the
preliminary trial hearing being conducted. On review, the Court recognized
this was a novel issue as prior decisions involved closed hearings at the behest
of the prosecution. 146 The Court also acknowledged a tension between a
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial and the First Amendment
rights of third parties. 147 The Court held that "while open criminal proceedings
give assurances of fairness to both the public and the accused, there are some
limited circumstances in which the right of the accused to a fair trial might be
undermined by publicity. ' 4 8 Moreover, the term "c ualified First Amendment
right of access" was maintained throughout the case.
Two other cases directly bear on the media's right to attend and report
on trials. In Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart,150 the Court considered a trial
judge's ruling prohibiting the press from reporting on specific evidentiary facts
prior to the empanelment of a jury. 15 1 The judge's order was premised on the
issue of the right to an impartial and unbiased jury. 152 The Court
acknowledged a possibility that excessive media coverage could make
empanelling an unbiased jury difficult. 153 The Court also recognized a tension
Id. at 3. California Penal Code section 868 (1985) required criminal proceedings to be open,
"unless exclusion of the public is necessary in order to protect the defendant's right to a fair
and impartial trial." Id.
145 Id.
146 Id., at 7, Two years prior to Press-Enterprise,the Court, in Waller v. Georgia,469 U.S. 39,
144

104 SCt 2210, 81 L.Ed.2d 31 (1984), held where a defendant objects to the closure of a
suppression hearing, the party seeking to close the hearing must advance an overriding interest
that is likely to be prejudiced. Id. at 47.
147 In Press Enterprise Co., 478 U.S. at 8, the court acknowledged the history of public access
to trials predated the Norman conquest of England. Id. However, the Court also concluded
there are some government operations that would "totally be frustrated if conducted openly. Id.
148 Id.
149 Id.

"0°427 U.S. 539 (1976).
51
' d., at 550.
152 id.
'53 Id., at 548The Court acknowledged the tension existed for much of United States
history in
writing:
The trial of Aaron Burr in 1807 presented Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, presiding as a
trial judge, with acute problems in selecting an unbiased jury. Few people in the area
of Virginia from which jurors were drawn had not formed some opinions
concerning Mr. Burr or the case, from newspaper accounts and heightened discussion
both private and public. The Chief Justice conducted a searching voir dire of the two
panels eventually called, and rendered a substantial opinion on the purposes of voir
dire and the standards to be applied.
Id., citing, 1 Causes Celebres, Trial of Aaron Burr for Treason 404-427, 473-481 (1879); (No.
14, 692g)(CC Va. 1807)). Burr was acquitted, so there was no occasion for appellate review to
examine the problem of prejudicial pretrial publicity. Mr. Chief Justice Marshall's careful voir
dire inquiry into the matter of possible bias makes clear that the problem is not a new one. Id.
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between the First and Sixth Amendments, but held that while there may be
instances the right to public access may be overcome by other matters of
greater importance, even in the face of pervasive media, a defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to an unbiased jury is not among them.' 54 This ruling is
premised on the belief that voire dire and other procedural mechanisms may be
used to obtain an unbiased jury. However, issues of bonafide national security
concerns may overcome the First Amendment where the Sixth Amendment
does not. Thus, the term "qualified First Amendment Right" has been a
subject of debate in the context of national security considerations.
In 2002, the Third Circuit, held that where bona fide national security
155
considerations are at risk, the media - and public - may be barred from view.
However, the Third Circuit acknowledged its decision was limited to
deportation proceedings. 156 Additionally, it recognized its decision was
counter to a similar case decided by the Sixth Circuit. 157 The government
sought the court to distinguish between Article III courts and Article I
proceedings such as deportation hearings. 158 One of the important features of
New Jersey Media Group is that while the Third Circuit declined to distinguish
other proceedings, it did distinguish access to political
Article III courts from
159
proceedings.
branch
Id. at 570, 96 S.Ct., at 2808. The Court specifically held:
Our analysis ends as it began, with a confrontation between prior restraint imposed to
protect one vital constitutional guarantee and the explicit command of another that the
freedom to speak and publish shall not be abridged. We reaffirm that the guarantees
of freedom of expression are not an absolute prohibition under all circumstances, but
the barriers to prior restraint remain high and the presumption against its use
continues intact.
Id.
114

155

56 Id. at 201
157
158

Id. (citing, Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.2d 681 (6th Cir. 2002)).
Id., at 207. The Court specifically held:

The Government contends that while Richmond Newspapers properly applies to civil
and criminal proceedings under Article III, the Constitution's text militates against
extending First Amendment rights to non-Article III proceedings such as deportation.
Its premise is one of expressio unius est exclusio alterius: Article III is silent on the
question of public access to judicial trials, but the Sixth Amendment expressly
incorporates the common law tradition of public trials, thus supporting the notion that
the First Amendment likewise incorporates that tradition for Article III purposes.
Citing, (Gov't Brief at 21-22.) Articles I and II, conversely, do address the question of
access, and they do not provide for Executive or Legislative proceedings to be open to
the public.
Id. (emphasis added).
9Id. at 210. The Court recognized that Social Security administrative proceedings, federal
energy regulation hearings, and administrative hearings related to national security matters
may be closed to the public. Id.,(citing 5 C.F.R. 2638.505(e)(2) (hearings on ethics charges
against government employees may be closed "in the best interests of national security, the
respondent employee, a witness, the public or other affected persons")
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The Third Circuit acknowledged six concerns in upholding the
government's closure of the deportation proceedings. First, public hearings
would reveal the investigation techniques. 160 Second, patterns of unlawful
entry into the United States might provide terrorist organizations with
information to construct a means for entry.' 61 Third, information on specific
62
individuals may provide terrorist cells the ability to evolve their operations.1163
Fourth, and additionally, terrorist cells may alter the time of their attacks.
Fifth, open proceedings might enable terrorist organizations to alter evidence
in the hopes of interfering with the proceedings.164 Finally, the Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS) has an interest in protecting the privacy of
detainees who have no connection to terrorist organizations.' 65 Ultimately,
the Third Circuit decided that these national 66security considerations
outweighed the right to an open deportation hearing. 1
Courts-marital are similar to Article III courts, but their authority rests
in the Executive branch under Article I. However, in the courts-martial
context, an emerging body of law suggests that the public also has a strong, but
qualified right to all stages in the court martial process. 167 This right possibly
extends to the pretrial confinement determination process; 168 and definitely in
Article 32 hearings, 69 courts-martial, 170 and appellate proceedings. 171
0
16
Id.,

Id.
162
Id.

at 218.

161

163id.

164
Id.
165

Id., at 218-19

166

Id., at 219.

The Court acknowledged the executive branch's duty to prevent another

September 11, where it feared that such a failure could lead to even greater demands for
restriction on liberty. Additionally, this decision in not without its detractors. See, e.g.,
RECENT CASE: First Amendment - Public Access to Deportation Hearings - Third Circuit
Holds That the Government Can Close "SpecialInterest" DeportationHearings, 116 HARV. L.
REV. 1193 (2003).
167 See, e.g., ABC, Inc. v. Powell, 47 M.J. 363 (CAAF 1997). [holding
that an Article 32
investigation is an open process]
168 See, MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL Rule 305 (2002). Pretrial confinement determinations
are essentially administrative in that the reviewing authority (magistrate) need not be a military
judge. The accused is not afforded the right to counsel in such proceedings. However, as in
the case of Summary courts-martial, it has become common practice to provide defense
counsel for pretrial confinement determinations.
169 The pretrial investigation of charges under Article 32, UCMJ, although not a court-martial,
is a judicial proceeding. See, e.g., MacDonald v. Hodson, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 582, 42 C.M.R. 184,
185 (1970). [holding an Article 32 should be open to the public] But see, e.g., San Antonio
Express News v. Morrow, 44 M.J. 706 (AFCCA 1996). In Morrow, the Air Force court upheld
an Article 32 investigating officer's determination to close the Article 32 to media. However,
the court acknowledged that the law favors a public proceeding:
We also believe the American public is best served by
pretrial investigations that, like courts-martial, are open to
public scrutiny. As was said of courts-martial, such
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However, the right is not absolute. For instance MRE 412 provides the court a
mechanism to protect alleged victims of sexual assault from public trial on
potentially embarrassing matters relating to sexual conduct. 172 Additionally,
child witnesses appear to be afforded some protections against public
scrutiny.173 And finally, where national security considerations exist, the right
to public trial may give way to those concerns.
B. The Right to a Complete Defense: Potential CIPA and MRE 505
Limits on Cross-Examination and Credibility Evidence
1. Generally
The Sixth Amendment affords a defendant the right to a complete
defense. 175 One aspect of a complete defense is the defendant's ability to
obtain the background and identity of prosecution witnesses for possible
impeachment and bias purposes. As noted further below, in cases involving
undercover agents or national security matters, courts have recognized a
balancing test between the defendant's constitutional right and the needs of
protecting persons or evidence from public knowledge. Difficulties exist in
circumventing an accused's right to fully probe witnesses and present a
complete defense. While these cases involve public security concerns, none
present national security considerations.
scrutiny 'is believed to effect a fair result by ensuring that
all parties perform their functions more responsibly,
encouraging witnesses to come forward, and discouraging
perjury.' We believe the accused, the press, and the public
have a recognizable interest in being informed of the
workings of our entire court-martial process, and that no
public interest is served by a blanket rule closing pretrial
hearings.
Id., citing United States v. Hershey, 20 M.J. 433, 436 (C.M.A. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
1062 (1986) (citations omitted).
70
1
See e.g. United States v. Fiske, 28 M.J. 1013 (AFCMR 1993); United States v. Travers, 25
M.J. 61 (CMA 1991); In Fiske, the defense counsel sought a closed hearing to which the
military judge granted without placing a reason on the record of trial. This caused the court to
comment:
"This is the second case we are aware of in this decade that a military judge has
closed an Air Force court-martial trial without a reason therefore being articulated on
the record. That's two too many."
Id.
71' See, e.g., MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL,
Rule 1203.
1 See MRE 412; United States v. Graham, 54 M.J. 605, 607 (NMCCA 2000).
'73 See, e.g., UnitedStates v. McCollum, 56 M.J. 837 (AFCCA 2002).
174 This later issue is analyzed in greater detail below
17 See e.g., California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984) [holding that the Constitutional
guarantee of due process requires that criminal defendants be afforded a meaningful
opportunity to present a complete defense.]
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In Alford v. United States,176 the Court reversed a conviction where the
trial judge prohibited the defense from cross-examining a witness as to that
individual's place of residence. 177 The witness had been placed in federal
protective custody and the defense argued that such matters were proper for
bias. 178 The Court reasoned that cross-examination of a witness is a "matter of
right."' 179 Short of self-incrimination concerns, a judge should normally not
prohibit cross-examination
testimony where the identity of a witness is
80
concerned. 1
In United States v. Rovario18 1 the Court recognized a privilege against
informant identities that permits the government to withhold disclosure of
either the identity or contents of a communication that would endanger the
secrecy of that information. 82 The privilege exists to "further the obligation of
citizens to communicate their knowledge of the commission of crimes to law
enforcement officials, and, by preserving their anonymity, encourages them to
perform that obligation."' However, this privilege must give way when
disclosure 84of the information "is relevant and helpful to the defense of an
accused.",1
In Smith v. Illinois, 85 the Court reviewed the use of pseudonym
testimony by a government informant. A prosecution witness, "James Jordan"
was not required to testify as to his real name or residence. 186 In reversing the
lower court, the Court recognized the defendant was not per se denied crossexamination, but that the denial affected the ability to probe the witness'
credibility. 187 The Court appeared to place concern on the denial of full
88 cross
examination, in part, because the witness was a government informant.
176

282 U.S. 687 (1930).

177Id.
178 Id.
179 Id.

180 id.
181353 U.S. 53 (1957).
182 Idat 59
183Id.
184Id., at 60-61
...
390 U.S. 131 (1968).
186Id.
187
188

Id.
Id. The Court noted:
At trial, the principal witness against the petitioner was a man who identified himself
on direct examination as James Jordan. This witness testified he had purchased a bag
of heroin from the petitioner in a restaurant with marked money provided by two
Chicago police officers. The.officers corroborated part of his testimony but only this
witness and the petitioner testified to the crucial events inside the restaurant and the
petitioner's version of those events was entirely different. The only real question at
trial, therefore, was the relative credibility of the petitioner and this prosecution
witness.

Id.
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Alford, Rovario, and Smith, provide limited guidance regarding the
issue of witness identity protection. Although witness identity protection, and
public trials are interrelated issues, these cases, however, are of only limited
value since none involved national security evidence and do not remotely
touch on hard evidence such as methodologies, reports, or a list of other
possibilities.
2. National Security Considerationsin Federal Court: United States v. Yunis
Cases involving classified evidence that impact national security are
problematic for courts. Unlike the Alford progeny of cases, issues of national
security are viewed as having a greater secrecy interest by courts. Therefore,
courts must perform a delicate balance between the defendant's right to present
a "complete defense," and the United States' ability and right to protect
evidence where disclosure might harm the national security.
In United States v. Yunis, 189the D.C. Circuit Court was confronted with
the issue of classified information which the defense claimed was important to
their case. Yunis was a Lebanese citizen on trial for various aircraft hijacking
charges on 11 June 1985.190 In order to capture Yunis, the FBI recruited an
individual named Jamal Hamdan into a government informant program.191
The two met on several occasions where their conversation was intercepted by
an undisclosed law enforcement gathering source or method. 192 Most of the
conversation had little to do with the hijacking and instead centered on
personal items.' 93 Still, the FBI collected enough evidence to obtain a warrant
for his arrest. 194 In September 1987, Hamdan and Yunis arrived in Cyprus
under the ruse of conducting a narcotics deal.' 9 5 On 13 September 1987, Yunis
was captured by the FBI after boarding a yacht manned by agents.' 96 From
there, he was transported back to the United States where he was arraigned for
trial.' 97 In preparing for trial, his defense counsel sought discovery of several
classified documents and recordings.198 The prosecution refused to provide the
"' 867 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
19 Id. at 618. Yunis, along with several other men, hijacked a Royal Jordanian Airlines
aircraft with a full crew complement and sixty passengers, including six Americans. Id. After
attempting and failing to fly to Tunis and Syria, Yunis and his compatriots evacuated the crew
and passengers and blew up the aircraft. Id.
191 Id.
192 Id.
193 Id.

The District Court characterized the transcripts of these conversations as something
"interesting for an Ann Landers column or Dorothy Dixon, or someone of that sort." Id.
194

id., at 619.

195 Id.

196 id.
197 Id.

From the yacht, Yunis was transferred to a United States Navy munitions ship, the
Butte, and then to the U.S.S. Saratoga, an aircraft carrier. Id. From that point, Yunis was
flown on a naval aircraft to Andrews Air Force Base, Washington D.C. Id.
198 Id. In a motion to compel discovery, the defense sought the following:
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evidence requested, claiming the defense failed to state provisions of law
entitling them to the evidence as well as the relevance of the specific items
sought. 199 Additionally, the prosecution sought to keepo some of the requested
evidence as non-discoverable classified information. In a series of pretrial
motions, the district court ordered the prosecution to provide indexed lists of
classified evidence, and the summary of all recordings between Yunis and
Hamdan. 201 The prosecution complied, in part, but withheld some recoding
evidence on the basis of national security. The district court, in response
conducted a three-part inquiry as to the sought evidence. The first step of this
inquiry was to determine relevance. The second step was a determination of
materiality. Finally, as the third step, the court balanced the rights of the
accused against the perceived harm to national security. The district court then
ordered the prosecution to fully comply with its earlier discovery ruling. 20 2 20In
3
response, the prosecution filed an interlocutory appeal with the circuit court.
The circuit court began its analysis with a discussion of Section 4 of
CIPA. The court concluded that Section 4 created no rights of discovery or
abridgement, but rather contemplated an "application of the general law of
discovery in criminal cases to the classified information area with limitations
imposed based on the sensitive nature of the classified information." 20 4 The
20 5
court acknowledged relevancy constitutes a very low threshold of proof.
1. Documents generated by other federal agencies, to include military and
intelligence organizations in connection with this case... this is to include any foreign
governments who assisted...
12. Copies of all tapes or documentation of conversations between Jamal Hamdan and
Mr. Yunis...
22. Any and all information concerning any tapes or wiretaps used in this case. The
request includes, but is not limited, to any intercepted wire, oral or electronic
communications, mobile tracking devices, pen registers, and trap and trace devices.
The breadth of the request covers past or present operations whether domestic
(warrant required) or nationalsecurity in nature andauthorization.
Id.
199 Id.

200

Id. In a pretrial motion, the prosecution relied on section 2 of CIPA which provides:
At any time after the filing of the indictment or information, any party may move for
a pretrial conference to consider matters relating to classified information that may
arise in connection with the prosecution. Following such motion.., the court shall
promptly hold a pretrial conference to establish the timing of requests for discovery.

Id.
201

Id.

202

Id., at 621. In response, the prosecution notified the court of their intention to not call

Hamdan as a witness and argued the sought evidence was no longer material. Id. However, the
district court appeared unmoved by this argument. Id.
203

Id.

204

Id. at 621. Section 4 reads:

205

Id.

The court, upon a sufficient showing, may authorize the United States to delete
specified items of classified information from documents to be made available to the
defendant through discovery under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure..."
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This is particularly the case where the defendant's own statements are at
issue.206 The circuit court concluded the lower court's determination of
relevancy to be correct. 207 However, after an in camera review of the
classified information, the circuit court found "two, or at most three, sentence
fragments in the transcribed
conversations possessed "even the remotest
2 °8

relevance to any issue.
The circuit court further acknowledged a government privilege for
national security concerns. This privilege is not written into CIPA, but rather
the latter law establishes procedures to protect classified information. In part,
the circuit court confined their analysis in the shadow of Rovario2 0 9 However,
the circuit court took exception to the district court's analysis of the privilege
test's third prong of balancing the national security considerations against the
materiality of the evidence. 21 The circuit court appeared to give deference to
the government's position, recognizing its "compelling interest in protecting
both the secrecy of information important to our national security and the
appearance of confidentiality so essential to the effective operation of our
foreign intelligence service." 211 As a result of this defense, the circuit court
concluded that "a mere showing of theoretical relevance" is not enough to
overcome the privilege, but rather an entitlement only to information that is
helpful to the defense of the accused, is the proper threshold.212 The circuit
court then concluded that the sought evidence was not sufficiently helpful to
the defense to warrant disclosure.2 13
Id. at 621-22. The court held, generally speaking, the production of a defendant's own
statements has become, "practically a matter of right even without a showing of materiality."
Id. citing United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 74 n. 80 (D.C. Cir 1976) (en banc), cert
denied431 U.S. 933 (1977).
...
Yunis, 867 F.2d 617, 620 (D.C.Cir. 1989).
208 Id. at 622.
206

Id. at 623. The court held, CIPA's procedures protect classified information similar to the
informants
privilege identified in Rovario. Id.
210
Id.The court concluded:
[T]he District Judge, in his review.., apparently misapprehended, at least in part, the
nature of the sensitive information the government sought to protect. Our own view
of the government's affidavits and transcripts reveals that much of the government's
security interest in the conversation lies not so much in the contents of the
conversations, as in the time, place, and nature of the government's ability to intercept
the conversation at all. Things that did make sense to the District Judge would make
all too much sense to a foreign counter-intelligence specialist who could learn much
about the nation's intelligence gathering capabilities from what these documents
revealed about sources and methods.
Id.
209

211 Id.
212 Id. (citing Rovario, 353 U.S. at 60-61)
213 Id. at 62-65 The court acknowledged

the possibility of depriving a defendant of potential
evidence. Id. However, in the case of Yunis, the defendant was readily available to assist his
counsel in his defense, particularly as to the conversations he engaged in with Hamdan. Id.
Additionally, the Circuit Court did not employ the three part test used by the trial court. Id.
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Yunis provides additional guidance for both sides in a federal trial. On
the one hand, the decision forces the defense to show relevance where it
intends to disclose or demands access to classified material. The prosecution,
likewise must be prepared to divulge all potential evidence to the judge for an
in camera review. Such .evidence may be voluminous, but any determination
for release or relevance is within the discretion of the judge and not the
prosecution.
III: CASE ANALYSIS: UNITED STATES V. LONETREE (I & II)
In United States v. Lonetree 214 the then Court of Military Appeals
upheld the efficacy of conducting part of a court martial outside of public view.
The court also upheld the protection of witness identity for national security
reasons. Of important note, the Supreme Court did not grant the case
certiorari. Lonetree involved espionage allegations against a Marine Corps
embassy guard in Moscow. Essentially, Sergeant Clayton Lonetree, became
involved in a romantic involvement with a Soviet agent named Violetta Seina.
During their relationship, he passed confidential information to another Soviet
agent named Yefimov (aka Uncle Sasha). This information included the
names and locations of covert United States intelligence agents, as well as,
personnel information regarding the United States embassies in Vienna and
Moscow. 2 15 At trial, he was charged, and ultimately convicted of violating
thirteen specifications of the UCMJ. 2 16 Because of the sensitive national
security nature of the court-martial, the prosecution motioned the court,
pursuant to MRE 505(j)(5), to seal the public from certain witness
testimony. 1 7 Over defense objection, the military judge ordered the public
excluded from part of the court-martial. 218 However, the judge did not make
However, the circuit court did not repudiate the test's usage either. Id. Merely, the Circuit
Court held the defendant failed the second prong of the test and did not conduct a balancing as
required by the third prong. Id. at 625.
214 31 M.J. 849 (NMCMA 1990), cert. denied 507 U.S. 1017 (1993).
21
1 Id., at 852.
216 Id., at 852. Sgt Lonetree was convicted of three specifications under Article
81, UCMJ
(Conspiracy to commit espionage); four specifications under Article 92, UCMJ (Failure to
obey order or regulation); five specifications under Article 134, UCMJ (General Article
Violation); and one specification under Article 106a (Espionage). He was sentenced to thirty
years, but this sentence was reduced by the Convening authority to twenty-five years.
Lonetree served only nine of these years before his release. See, e.g., CNN News release, 28
February 1996. [describing Lonetree's release from confinement]
217 Lonetree, 31 M.J. at 853.
218 Id. The Navy Marine Court noted that some intelligence agents testified in closed sessions,
while other agent testimony occurred in a divided setting between closed hearings and public
view. Id. Sgt Lonetree was defended by both military and civilian defense counsel. Sergeant
Lonetree's military defense counsel was provided to him at no personal expense. However, he
retained Mr. William Kunstler and Mr. Michael Stuhff, who later became the focus for a claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel. Lonetree, 35 M.J. 396, 412.
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individual findings of fact for each witness. Rather the judge ruled, after in
camera review, generally as to subject matter.
On appeal, Lonetree argued each closure required a separate judicial
finding. The Navy-marine court decided otherwise, holding that MRE 505
does not require separate judicial findings for each closed section. 219 Rather
MRE 505 is directed toward the information sought to be exempted from
disclosure at a public trial. 220 Thus, any number of witnesses testifying to the
protected evidence will not require separate findings.22' Lonetree also objected
to the method of closing the court-martial and lack of accompanying judicial
instructions for each closure. 222 The Navy Marine Court held that the trial
judge erred in not providing oral instructions to the trier of fact for each
disclosure. 223 However,224the appellate court also found this omission
constituted harmless error.
The second national security issue at trial and on appeal dealt with the
protection of witness identity and information. At the prosecution's urging, the
court prevented the defense from learning the identity of a government witness
and obtaining classified information. 225 As a result of this ruling, a witness
was permitted to testify under a pseudonym and the defense was prohibited
from obtaining certain classified evidence. 226 On appeal, the Navy-Marine
court analyzed this unique issue in light of both the Sixth Amendment-based
right to cross examine witnesses, as well as the broad right of discovery.227
The court then analyzed the background and purpose of MRE 505, finding its
Id., at 853
220 Id.,(citing MRE 505(i)(4)(A) and (C)).
29
221

Id. The court specifically held:
To require a military judge to make specific findings each time a series of questions is
to be asked of a witness, after the judge had already determined the responses were
classified, would be to create unnecessary and disruptive bifurcation of the trial and
constitute an exercise in redundancy. The confusion would make a difficult trial an
incomprehensible one and would be the antithesis of a fair and orderly proceeding
within the context of the facts of this case.

Id.

Id., at 854.
Id., at 854-55
224 Id.' The court appeared concerned along the same lines as the Supreme Court's reasoning
in
Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964), that jurors cannot
differentiate between the importance of a court protected disclosure and the credibility of the
testimony. However, the court also held, "While error, there was not prejudice, because the
weight of the evidence against Sergeant Lonetree was so overwhelming that the failure to give
the instructions had no effect upon the findings." Lonetree, 31 M.J. at 855.
225 Id., at 856. The military judge reviewed the prosecution's evidence in camera, along with
an accompanying top-secret affidavit to support invoking MRE 505's classified information
222
223

?rivilege.

Id.

6i d. The court held MRE 505(g)(2) applied when the government needs to limit or prevent

disclosure. Id.
227.Id
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roots in both the House version of the CIPA, 2 28 and the Supreme Court's
review of executive privilege in several cases.229 The Navy-Marine court
concluded that CIPA was intended to counter the problem of "graymail" then
seeping into United States criminal courts. 230 The court then analyzed MRE
505 in a balancing context between an accused's rights and the need to protect
national security information.2 3' The court also distinguished the use of MRE
505 in Lonetree from Alford and Smith. As noted earlier, in Smith, a
prosecution witness testified under alias without enunciating a good reason,
while in Alford, the prosecution had a government agent testify under a
pseudonym. The Navy-Marine court distinguished the cases holding neither
Alford nor Smith created a per se rule against pseudonym testimony.232 Even
though the court ruled against a per se rule, the use of a pseudonym may
deprive the defense from impeachment evidence. The court recognized the
Sixth Amendment might be violated when an accused is prohibited from
"placing an adverse witness in his proper setting." 233 Nonetheless, the court
found the right of impeachment is not absolute.23 4 Indeed, the court placed
reliance on the two prong test set in Rovario, as well as the Court's statement
that it is necessary to balance, "the public interest in protecting the flow of
information against the individual's right to prepare his defense." 2 35 The
Navy-Marine court then required this two-part test for the accused to show
prejudice. Relying on Yunis, the court held the accused must prove the
requested material is relevant and material. The court recognized that while
the first threshold is satisfied by "a mere showing of theoretical" relevance, the
term "material" denotes a higher standard of proof.2 36 Also, the Navy-marine
court relied on Yunis, for the efficacy of in camera review procedures.

228

18 U.S.C.App. § 1-16

Lonetree, 31 M.J. at 857 (citing United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1(1953)); United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
230 Lonetree, 31 M.J. at 857. The court defined "graymail" as occurring "when an accused
229

seeks discovery or disclosure of sensitive national security information for the purpose of
forcing the Government to discontinue prosecution to safeguard the information." Id., citing
United States v. Smith, 780 F.2d 1102, 1105 (4 th Cir. 1985).
231 Lonetree 31 M.J., at 858.
232 Id. The court also analyzed United States v. Alston, 460 F.2d 48, 51 ( 5th Cir 1972) in
reaching a conclusion that no per se rule existed against pseudonym testimony. Id.
233 Id., at 859.
234 Id., (citing McGrath v. Vinzant, 528 F.2d 681, 684 (1st Cir.
1976)).
235 Lonetree, 31 M.J. at 859. Holding:
First, the privilege must be applicable to the
circumstances of the case and not be limited by its underlying purpose. Id. Thus, if the
information to be protected is known to the accused and can no longer be protected, then the
privilege cannot be invoked. Id. Second, based on notions of fundamental fairness, when the
information is "relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to a fair
determination of a cause, the privilege must give way." Id.
236 Lonetree, 31 M.J. at 860.
237md..
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In reviewing the facts of Lonetree, the Navy-Marine court placed
weight on the fact that John Doe, had repeated contacts with the KGB."' The
only significant substantive issue regarding his testimony was a single prior
inconsistent statement. His trial testimony was corroborated in part by the
testimony of other witnesses, and it sufficiently corroborated Sergeant
Lonetree's confession. Finally, the court appeared pleased with the military
judge's instruction to the trier of fact that239the defense was restricted from cross
examination into John Doe's credibility.
In Lonetree II, the then Court of Military Appeals upheld the NavyMarine Court's decision and adopted its Sixth Amendment analysis. The
Court of Military Appeals held that the evidence relating to John Doe's
background provided the defense with sufficient information for crossexamination. 240 The Court of Military Appeals first recognized that an
accused's "right to know a witness's background is not without limit." 24 1 The
Court then analyzed prior federal court holdings, in particular, Rovario and
Yunis. The Court found particularly relevant, the District of Columbia Circuit
test was
Court's application of a two-part structure in Yunis, where a balancing
242
cumulative.
was
Doe
John
of
evidence
the
because
not required
As with the case of the Navy-Marine Court, the Court of Military
Appeals possessed the contested in camera evidence relating to John Doe's
testimony. The Court found the in camera evidence was not so essential as to
deprive Lonetree of due process. 243 The Court's reasoning for not finding a
denial of due process was based, in part, on the fact that John Doe did not
provide a central piece of evidence to the prosecution's case because Lonetree
Moreover, the Court of Military Appeals found the trial
had confessed. 4
238

Id. The court found as corroborating facts to both Doe's testimony and Lonetree's

confession the following: Lonetree had expressed admiration for the KGB, Id. He purchased
expensive clothing items for Violetta. Id. He possessed pictures and letters from her. Id. He

received gifts from "Uncle Sasha" including a jewelry case. Id. He later expressed fear of the
KGB. Id. At one point he sought leave during a period the KGB wanted him to surreptitiously
visit Moscow. Id.
239 Id. at 864. The judge at trial instructed the court as follows:
Under normal circumstances the defense has full opportunity to cross-examine a
witness concerning his or her true name, background and/or circumstances
surrounding his or her testimony. In one respect, cross-examination into these matters
assists you, the finders of fact, in determining the credibility of the witness.
Therefore, you may consider the restriction I have placed on John Doe's testimony as
well as the restriction of the defense's cross-examination in evaluating his credibility.
If, after hearing John Doe's testimony and observing his demeanor, you have enough

information to determine his credibility, then you may give such weight to his
testimony that is commensurate with that determination.
Id. at 864-65.
240 35 M.J. at 405.
241 Id. at 408.
242 Id at 409-10.
243

Id. at 410.

244 Id.
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judge had properly
exercised the "safety of persons" in maintaining John Doe's
24 5
identity as secret.
An issue of first instance also arose in Lonetree I. The government
motioned the Navy-Marine Court to close the court for oral argument. That
court directed a closed session for all arguments pertaining to classified
information. 246 Lonetree appealed this issue to the Court247of Military Appeals.
That court found the Navy-Marine Court's action proper.
IV: LONETREE'S AFTERMATH AND FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS
Since Lonetree, there have been few espionage courts-martial, and of
these none has challenged the constitutionality of MRE 505.248 However, there
have been cases involving a compromise of national security based on
dereliction of duty, or failing to obey a lawful regulation. For instance, in
United States v. Brown, 249 an active duty member was sentenced to two years
confinement and a bad conduct discharge for sending classified information to
an unauthorized person. 250 On appeal, Brown did not challenge the MRE 505
procedures which closed his court-martial to the public during certain
testimony. Instead, he appealed the jurisdiction of the convening authority to
try the case. 25!125Likewise, in United States v. Fleming,252 the accused was
convicted of mishandling and failing to safeguard classified information..
During the trial, the military judge failed to instruct the trier of fact that his
order to seal the courtroom to the public did not constitute a statement of
guilt. 254 The Court of Military Appeals *did not consider the failure to
constitute reversible error. 2 55 In United States v. Roller,256 the accused was
245
246

247

Id. at 411.
Id.
Id. While rare, in camera oral arguments are not unheard of in federal courts. See, e.g.,

Application of the United States, 427 F.2d 639, 641 (9th Cir 1970)[recognizing the rarity of in
camera evidentiary reviews]; Central National Bank v. U.S. Department of Treasury, 912 F.2d
897, 900 ( 7 th Cir. 1990) [recognizing the need for in camera evidentiary reviews]
248 Se, e.g., United States v. Anzalone, 40 M.J. 658 (NMCCA 1994). Anzalone was
prosecuted
and convicted of attempted espionage. Although the court utilized the MRE 505 procedure to
protect classified evidence, the accused did not appeal, the court's grant of a closed hearing
during part of the trial. The main issue in Anzalone's appeal was one of factual sufficiency.
249 39 M.J. 114 (CMA 1994).
"OId. at 115.
251 Id. This argument was found to be without merit.
252 38 M.J. 126 (CMA 1993).
253 Id. Fleming was a mixed pleas case. He was sentenced to a bad conduct discharge and four
years confinement. Id. However, the convening authority reduced his sentence to twenty-four
months. Id. Fleming collected, for his personal use, hundreds of photographs taken from a
submarine periscope. Id. These photographs constituted classified material. Id.

254

Id.

255

Id. However, the court pointed out that in United States v. Grunden, 2 M.J. 116 (CMA

1977), the court mandated such an instruction because the failure to do so might cause the trier
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convicted of "permitting" classified material to be removed from its place of
storage. 257 As in these other cases, Roller did not challenge the use of MRE
505 on appeal. Instead, he argued a "factual sufficiency" basis for challenging
his conviction.2 5 8 However, the fact that Lonetree remains "good law," and
that federal CIPA law strengthens the case for both courtroom closure and
limiting discovery rights as to classified material, does not mean analysis on
MRE 505 should cease. Three salient areas ought to continue as a focus for
concern: the defacto limitation on right to counsel because of security
clearance concerns; the discovery limitation tensions inherent with the right to
have counsel fully investigate the offenses and present a complete defense, and
the right of public access. As seen from the analysis below, these issues are
interrelated in the context of a trial involving MRE 505.
A. Right to Counsel:
Because most military defense counsel will possess some type of
clearance, it is likely that most will be entitled to review classified documents.
This does not remain true of civilian defense counsel. An accused has the right
to contract a civilian defense counsel in most courts-martial cases, 259 however,
this right is not absolute. 260 The right to a specific counsel may give way to
docketing considerations, status and availability of defense counsel, and,
perhaps, the lack of a security clearance.26 ' Should the accused seek a security
clearance for a civilian defense counsel, he will likely abrogate his right to a
speedy trial.262 This appeared a concern even prior to the existence of MRE

of fact to infer guilt. United States v. Grunden, 2 M.J. 116 (CMA 1977). In Fleming, the
judge tailored a separate presumption of innocence instruction that was lacking in Grunden.
256 37 M.J. 1093 (CMA 1993).
257 Id. Roller accidentally removed classified material from his place of work and then took it
home. Id. When he discovered the material, he stored it at home, with the intention of
destroying it. Id. However, a contracted mover began to pack the contents of his garage and
discovered the information. Id. Roller was convicted on this basis. He received ten months
and a bad conduct discharge. Id.
258 Id.
In Miller, the military
259 See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 47 M.J. 352, 358 (CMA 1997)
judge refused to grant a continuance so that the accused's newly contracted civilian defense
counsel could have time to prepare for trial. Id. The Court of Appeals determined Miller was
prejudiced by the denial of a continuance. Id.
The right to counsel is rooted in the Sixth Amendment. For a comprehensive analysis
of this right in military courts, see, e.g., Lt Col. Norman K. Thompson and Capt Joshua E.
Kastenberg, The Attorney-Client Privilege. PracticalMilitary Applications of a Professional

Core Value, 49 A.F. L. REV. 1 (2000)
260

See e.g. United States v. Beckley, 55 M.J. 15 (CAAF 2001); United States v. Thomas, 22

M.J. 57, 59 (CMA 1986) (citing Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1 (1983)).
261 See, e.g., United States v. Bin Laden, 58 F. Supp. 113, 118-19 (S.D.N.Y 1999).
262 See, e.g., RCM 707.
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505. In United States v. Nichols,263 an intelligence officer retained a civilian
counsel in a court-martial involving classified materials. Because the civilian
counsel did not possess a security clearance, he was unable to attend the
Article 32 hearing.264 The court recognized the potential problem with cases
involving civilian counsel but concluded the possibility of inordinate delay
rests with the accused's choice of counsel, assuming that the counsel can even
obtain clearance.265
A secondary issue arises in the context of an "uncleared counsel."
Should the civilian counsel be unable, or unwilling, to obtain a clearance, the
accused will likely need to find other counsel or be content with his appointed
counsel. If the accused seeks to continue representation by an uncleared
counsel, and the court permits this representation, the counsel will ultimately
be precluded from a full representation of his client. 266 A less than full
Because counsel are
representation is an anathema to military practice.
expected to be competent to practice before a court, any limitations on the right
to counsel in the national security context, are probably found in the rules
related to competency to practice. 267 One case provides military courts with
guidance on this issue. In United States v. Bin Laden,268 the District Court for
the Southern District of New York held the right to select counsel is not an
absolute right..269 In that case, the prosecution moved the court to compel
defense counsel objected
clearance of defense counsel. 2 70 The prospective
against a compelled background inquiry. 27 1 The District Court, in response
263

8 U.S.C.M.A. 119, 23 C.M.R. 343, 350-53 (CMA 1957). The Court, in Nichols recognized

the government had three choices in dealing with an accused represented by civilian counsel:
"It can permit the accused to be defended by his own lawyer, or it can defer further
proceedings against him, or it can, for proper cause, disbar the lawyer presented by
the accused from practice before courts-martial."
Id. at 349.
264 Id.
265 Id. (holding: It is arguable that if exclusion of counsel is not permitted, except as a result of
a disbarment proceeding, an accused's choice of questionable counsel can inordinately delay
the proceedings
against him)
266 See e.g. United States v. Schmidt, 59 M.J. 841 (AFCCA 2004) rev. 60 M.J. 1 (CAAF 2002).
In Schmidt, the Air Force initially denied the accused's counsel access to classified material by
virtue of counsel no possessing a proper clearance. Ultimately, counsel obtained a proper
clearance, but the government refused to permit the accused to "discuss classified material,"
with the civilian counsel. The Air Force Court upheld the trial judge's ruling. However,
CAAF reversed, finding the lower court erroneously relied on MRE 505(h)(1). This section
only applies to public disclosure and not communication between attorney and client. 60 M.J.
1,2.
See, e.g., Beckley, 55 M.J. 15, 17 (CAAF 2001). In re application of Skewes, 52 M.J. 562
(AFCCA 1999); United States v. Calhoun, 47 M.J. 520, 526-27 (AFCCA 1997).
268 58 F. Supp 113 (SDNY 1999).
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269 id.
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Id. at 115.
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Id. at 118-19.
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held that because of the national security risks involved in the case, a
background inquiry was appropriate. 272 Thus, under bin Laden the onus of a
"cleared counsel" falls on the accused.
B. Discovery Limitations and the Right to a Complete Defense
Every case involving the use of in camera proceedings and evidentiary
substitutions such as summaries and redactions, undoubtedly raises appeals
issues. As noted throughout this Article, the concepts of due process and the
right to a fair trial frown on discovery limits. Possibilities for limitations arise,
such as in the case of witness identities, statements against interest, and a lack
of access to all prior inconsistent statements of witnesses. For instance, a
scenario where an undercover operative provides several inconsistent
statements, the defense normally would utilize these for impeachment purposes.
However, the prior inconsistent statements may become unavailable (and
unknown) to the defense through the redaction and summary process. In part,
the defense is stymied because they may, at best, be only able to argue
theoretical relevance, at the outset of trial and the military judge would be
within his or her discretion to deny discovery.
As a result, an accused is faced with two choices: sealing the
courtroom from the public and accept a non-disclosure "gag" order from the
judge, or limiting the defense in both discovery and presentation of evidence.
While this may seem as an unfortunate choice, the law currently recognizes a
balance between a public trial and national security concerns. This choice
becomes important to the accused for an additional reason. While the service
appellate courts enjoy fact-finding responsibilities, they are also at liberty to
apply the harmless error test to otherwise erroneous rulings by the military
judge. It may also be incumbent upon the accused to limit his counsel choices
to service members (and perhaps the few civilians) who already possess a
high-level security clearance.
C. Continuing Media Interest
As long as criminal trials occur involving national security, the media
will maintain an interest. For instance, in United States v. King,273 a naval
cryptologist was charged with espionage. Ultimately his charges were dropped,
it appears in some part, due to high media exposure. 274 Guidance for
determining when a court-martial should be closed to public view has existed
Id.
See, e.g., King v. Ramos, NMCCA (unpub. 26 Jan. 2001); also King v. United States
NMCCA (unpub.7 Dec. 2000).
272

273

274 See, e.g., "Navy Espionage Case Expected to be Dropped," ABC News television
broadcast,

Mar. 9 2001).
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Prior to the existence of MRE 505, the then Court of
for some time.
Military Review, observed, "The right to a public trial is not absolute and
under exceptional circumstances, limited portions of a criminal trial may be
partially closed over defense objection. In each instance, the exclusion must be
used sparingly with the emphasis always toward a public trial. 276 In Grunden,
the Court of Military Appeals fashioned a two-part test to determine which
portions of a trial involving matters of national security could be closed to the
public. The two part test was enunciated as "the trial judge or (Article 32)
investigating officer must first determine whether the perceived need urged as
grounds for the exclusion of the -public is of sufficient magnitude so as to
outweigh the danger of miscarriage of justice., 277 The second part of the test
was premised on where the "need outweighs the danger of a miscarriage of
justice, he must then determine the scope of the exclusion." The language in
Gruden suggests a very high burden of necessity for the government to
overcome. 278 Gruden remains controlling law for judicial determinations in
courtroom closure issues. Yet, the term "national security," itself, implies the
"heavy burden" standard is overcome by proper classification.
While third party assertions to a public trial are troubling to the
prosecution, in the national security context, they may also present difficulties
for the defense. There may be instances such as where a pretrial agreement is
conditioned on a closed hearing. Additionally, a closed court may afford an
accused a stronger argument to obtain classified evidence and present it to the
trier of fact. This argument has merit, in part, because most military members
have some type of clearance. As a result, the military judge may find it less
likely the chance for classified evidence to be disseminated to the public.
Finally, because of the nature of military justice and the involvement of
a convening authority, in cases where disclosure of classified information is
possible, nothing prevents a convening authority from moving the case to a
remote location. In essence, there is no lawful prohibition against moving a
court-martial to Diego Garcia, Guantanamo, or Adak. Administratively
moving a court-martial to a remote site may be problematic in other ways, and
it should only occur where no other alternative is possible. Such a move might
prove monetarily costly and present additional public policy considerations.
At the same time, an accused has no constitutional right to choose the place of
his court-martial.

275

Jackson, supra note 2 at 16-20.

Id. at 118.
277 Id. at 122.
216

To fulfill the requirements of this two-part test, the government must
demonstrate that it has met the heavy burden of justifying the imposition of restraints on the
right to an open trial. Id. The Government must do this by demonstrating the classification of
the materials in question and delineating the portions of the case that will involve those
materials. Id.
278

See id. at 120.
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V. CONCLUSION
Trials involving matters of national security are complex because of the
necessary balance between an accused's Constitutional rights to present a
complete defense and a public trial, as well as third-party rights to attend and
report on trials, versus the recognized need to maintain secrecy over
information vital to national security. The absence of a formal cold war does
not mitigate the importance of protecting classified information. Indeed, a
number of entities, state and non-state actors alike, may be interested in
learning how the United States creates, processes, and safeguards classified
information, as much as what is contained in the information itself. However,
it is possible to ensure a fair trial within the constraints of MRE 505. Because
trials involving MRE 505 are rare, a valuable corpus of persuasive law can be
found in the federal CIPA cases. This article has provided analysis as to the
workings and potential pitfalls of both CIPA and MRE 505. While each
service branch will approach trials involving classified information in an
administratively different manner, the legal basis for continuing the reasonable
use of MRE 505 is sound.
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